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ABSTRACT
Reliable and agile spectrum sensing as well as secure communica-
tion are key requirements of a cognitive radio system. In this paper,
secrecy throughput of a cognitive radio is maximized in order to de-
termine the sensing threshold, the sensing time, and the transmission
power. Constraints of the problem are defined as a lower-bound on
the detection probability, an upper-bound on the average energy con-
sumption per time-frame, and the maximum transmission power of
the cognitive radio. We show that the problem can be solved by an
on-off strategy where the cognitive radio only performs sensing and
transmits data if the cognitive channel gain is greater than the av-
erage eavesdropper channel gain. The problem is then solved by a
line-search over sensing time. Eventually, the secrecy throughput of
the cognitive radio is evaluated employing the IEEE 802.15.4/Zig-
Bee standard.
Index Terms— Secrecy capacity, secrecy throughput, power al-
location, resource allocation, cognitive radio
1. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radios are proposed as a solution to the spectrum scarcity
problem [1]. Interweave cognitive radio is a category of cognitive
radio systems where each cognitive radio listens to the wireless spec-
trum in periodic sensing slots, and the cognitive radio gains spectrum
access if the primary user is deemed to be inactive [2]. Therefore,
increasing the throughput of the cognitive radio, while protecting
the primary user from harmful interference of the cognitive user is a
critical issue. Similar to any other wireless communication system,
cognitive radios are also vulnerable to inadequate security due to the
presence of an eavesdropper. Therefore, it is also important to make
sure that confidential messages of a cognitive transmitter are secure.
Optimization of the cognitive radio throughput subject to the
constraint on the amount of interference to the primary user is con-
sidered thoroughly in the literature, e.g. [3], [4]. Joint optimiza-
tion of the cognitive transmission power and spectrum sensing while
maximizing the throughput is another problem which is considered
in [5, 6, 7] for example. However, there are only few works which
consider resource allocation in the presence of an eavesdropper. The
authors in [8] consider a scenario where one or more eavesdroppers
listen to an underlay multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) cog-
nitive radio system. Underlay cognitive radios are another type of
cognitive systems where the cognitive transmitter gains access to the
spectrum concurrently with the primary use, while keeping the inter-
ference below a specific threshold [2]. A MISO underlay cognitive
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scenario is considered in [9]. The authors show that while concur-
rent secondary transmission with the primary user may reduce the
primary channel capacity, it can potentially improve the secrecy rate
of the primary user. Recently, Zhang et al. [10] studied an overlay
cognitive scenario where the primary user gains a higher security
rate by leveraging cooperation with cognitive users. Overlay cogni-
tive radios are another category of cognitive systems where cognitive
users are aware of the primary channel and codebook messages [2].
None of these works consider optimization of the secrecy capacity
for interweave cognitive radios. Further, the constraint on the energy
consumption, which is a critical issue in a cognitive sensor network
[3], has not been investigated in the context of physical layer security
for cognitive radios.
In this paper, secrecy throughput of an interweave cognitive ra-
dio system is maximized subject to a constraint on the probability of
detection, maximum transmission power, and maximum energy con-
sumption per time-frame, in order to obtain the sensing threshold,
the sensing time, and the transmission power. The constraint on the
probability of detection protects the primary receiver from harmful
interference of the cognitive transmitter, while the other constraints
are inherent limitations of a low-power sensor network. Further, we
assume that the cognitive radio is only aware of the average chan-
nel gain to the eavesdropper and thus instead of the instantaneous
secrecy capacity, the average secrecy capacity is considered for op-
timization. Given the sensing threshold and the sensing time, the
average secrecy capacity optimization problem is shown to be non-
concave in the transmission power Pc, and thus instead, a lower-
bound on the average secrecy capacity is maximized. This way, we
show that the power allocation problem reduces to an on-off strategy,
where the cognitive radio performs sensing and eventually accesses
the spectrum upon the absence of the primary transmitter, only if the
cognitive channel gain is better than the average eavesdropper chan-
nel gain. It is shown that the problem can be solved by a line-search
over the sensing time, when this condition is satisfied.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present
the system model and problem formulation in Section 2. In this sec-
tion, we further analyze the problem and provide a sub-optimal so-
lution. The secrecy throughput of the cognitive radio system in the
presence of an eavesdropper is evaluated in Section 3, and finally we
draw our conclusions in Section 4.
2. ANALYSIS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a cognitive radio system which consists of a cognitive
transmitter and receiver pair as shown in Fig. 1. The cognitive trans-
mitter senses the spectrum in periodic sensing slots by receiving N
observation samples denoted by ri. Denoting wi, si and hp to be
the noise, the signal and the channel gain between the primary user
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the system model
and the cognitive transmitter, in order to detect the presence (or ab-
sence) of the primary user, the cognitive transmitter solves a binary
hypothesis testing problem as follows
H0 : ri = wi, i = 1, . . . , N,
H1 : ri = hpsi + wi, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
whereH0 andH1 denote the respective absence and the presence of
the primary user, wi is the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
with zero mean and variance σ2w, si is the primary user signal which
follows an i.i.d. random Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2s , and the channel gain hp is assumed to be constant dur-
ing each sensing period. The average received SNR of the primary
user signal at the cognitive transmitter is thus γ = |hp|
2σ2s
σ2w
, where
γ denotes the SNR. An energy detector is employed by the cogni-
tive transmitter in order to solve (1). The energy detector calculates
accumulated energy of N samples and compares the result with a
threshold denoted by λ, as follows
E = 1
σ2w
N∑
i=1
|ri|2
H1
R
H0
λ, (2)
where |·| denotes the absolute value. Based on the model parameters
described under (1), E follows a chi-square distribution with 2N de-
grees of freedom under H0 andH1 [11]. This way, the probabilities
of false alarm and detection are obtained by
Pf = Pr(E ≥ λ|H0) =
Γ(N, λ
2σ2w
)
Γ(N)
, (3)
Pd = Pr(E ≥ λ|H1) =
Γ(N, λ
2(1+γ)
)
Γ(N)
, (4)
where Γ(a) is the gamma function and Γ(a, x) is the upper-
incomplete gamma function.
The cognitive transmitter gains access to the sensing band, if the
primary user is deemed to be inactive. A hidden eavesdropper is
listening to the cognitive radio data transmission with a non-line-of-
sight (NLOS) Rayleigh fading channel denoted by he as depicted in
Fig. 1. Denoting Pc to be the transmission power of the cognitive
transmitter, and hc to be the channel gain between the pair of cog-
nitive transmitter and receiver, the secrecy capacity of the cognitive
radio is obtained as follows
Cs,H0 = E|he|2
[
log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− log2
(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w
)]
,
(5)
Cs,H1 =E|he|2
[
log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w + |hcp|2P
)
− log2
(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w + |hep|2P
)]
, (6)
where Cs,H0 and Cs,H1 represent the secrecy capacity when the pri-
mary user is deemed to be inactive and active, i.e., when absence
of the primary user is correctly detected or detection of the primary
user presence is missed, respectively. Further, P is the transmission
power of the primary user, hep the channel between the primary user
and the eavesdropper, hcp the channel between the primary user and
the cognitive receiver, and E[·] denotes the expected value. Note that
here we assume that the instantaneous hc is known but the instanta-
neous he is not known, and we only know the E|he|2 [|he|2].
Periodic time-frames of T units are assigned to the cognitive ra-
dio, where the cognitive radio performs spectrum sensing in the be-
ginning of each time-frame. The cognitive transmitter starts sending
data to the cognitive receiver, if the outcome of sensing leads to the
absence of the primary user. Denoting Ts to be the sensing time and
fs to be the sampling frequency, Ts = Nfs . This way, the cognitive
transmitter can access to the spectrum during the remaining T − Ts
units. The cognitive radio secrecy throughput in each time-frame,
denoted by Rs is thus defined as follows
Rs =pi0(1− Pf )Pr(success|H0)T − Ts
T
Cs,H0
+ pi1(1− Pd)Pr(success|H1)T − Ts
T
Cs,H1 , (7)
where pi0 and pi1 are a priori probabilities of the primary user ab-
sence and presence, and Pr(success|H0) and Pr(success|H1)
are the probabilities of successful transmission under H0 and H1.
In [3], it is discussed that since the received data at the cognitive re-
ceiver is free of the interference under H0, Pr(success|H0) → 1.
On the other hand, since the received signal at the cognitive
receiver is interfered with the primary user signal under H1,
Pr(success|H1) → 0. Therefore, (7) approximately becomes
Rs ≈ pi0(1− Pf )T − Ts
T
Cs,H0 . (8)
As mentioned earlier, a cognitive radio gains spectrum access
by avoiding harmful interference to the primary user. Therefore, a
constraint on the probability of detection is considered in this paper
and current standards, such as IEEE 802.22 [12], which protects the
primary user from harmful interference of the cognitive transmitter.
This constraint is defined as a lower-bound on the probability of de-
tection, denoted by α.
Moreover, cognitive radios are often low-power sensors with
limited battery capacity. To incorporate this limitation in our prob-
lem formulation, we let the the average energy consumption per
time-frame to be less than a specific threshold denoted by Emax.
Each cognitive radio consumes energy in two folds: a) some energy
is spent on sensing, and b) if the primary user is deemed to be inac-
tive, some energy is also consumed on data transmission. This way,
denoting Ps and Pc to be the sensing and transmission power, the
average energy consumption of the cognitive radio per time-frame
becomes PsTs +
[
pi0(1 − Pf ) + pi1(1 − Pd)
]
Pc(T − Ts). Note
that here we assume the idle energy due to the non data transmission
is negligible, and the cognitive radio always has data available for
transmission. No data transmission occurs when the primary user
is correctly detected or a false alarm occurs. However, as shall be
shown later, due to inadequate security, in some cases the cogni-
tive radio should not transmit any data even if the primary user is
deemed to be absent. In such scenarios, performing spectrum sens-
ing becomes irrelevant and thus some energy can be saved for future
communications. We should also note that each radio in general has
a peak power constraint which needs to be taken into account. Here,
the maximum transmission power is denoted by Pc,max.
Our goal is to assign the sensing threshold, the sensing time, and
cognitive transmission power so as to maximize the cognitive radio
secrecy throughput subject to the probability of detection constraint
and the maximum energy consumption per time-frame, as follows
max
λ,Ts,Pc
pi0(1− Pf )T − Ts
T
Cs,H0
s.t. Pd ≥ α,
PsTs +
[
pi0(1− Pf ) + pi1(1− Pd)
]
Pc(T − Ts) ≤ Emax,
Pc ≤ Pc,max,
0 < Ts ≤ T. (9)
Note that here the available channel side information includes the
cognitive channel gain, hc and the average eavesdropper channel
gain denoted by ζe. For a given λ and Ts in the feasible set of (9),
we can rewrite (9) as follows
max
Pc
E|he|2
[
log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− log2
(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w
)]
s.t Pc ≤ min
{
Pc,max,
Emax − PsTs[
pi0(1− Pf ) + pi1(1− Pd)
]
(T − Ts)
}
.
(10)
The problem (10) in the current shape is not concave inPc. However,
since a log function is concave, using Jensen’s inequality, we can
write
E|he|2
[
log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− log2
(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w
)]
= log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− E|he|2
[
log2
(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w
)]
≥ log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− log2 E|he|2
[(
1 +
|he|2Pc
σ2w
)]
= log2
(
1 +
|hc|2Pc
σ2w
)
− log2
(
1 +
E|he|2
[|he|2]Pc
σ2w
)
. (11)
Therefore, instead of solving (10), we solve the following problem
which is the lower-bound of (10),
max
Pc
log2
(
1 + aPc
)− log2 (1 + bPc)
s.t Pc ≤ min
{
Pc,max,
Emax − PsTs[
pi0(1− Pf ) + pi1(1− Pd)
]
(T − Ts)
}
,
(12)
where a = |hc|2/σw, and b = ζe/σ2w where ζe = E
[
|he|2
]
. We
know that log2
(
1 + aPc
) − log2 (1 + bPc) = log2 ( 1+aPc1+bPc
)
.
Again since log is a concave function, the optimal solution of (12)
is the one which maximizes
(
1+aPc
1+bPc
)
. We note that if a ≤ b,
log2
(
1+aPc
1+bPc
)
≤ 0 and thus the optimal solution of (12) becomes
P ∗c = 0. Therefore, in case |hc| ≤
√
ζe, the cognitive radio should
not transmit, even if the primary user is perceived to be absent. Con-
sequently, performing spectrum sensing when |hc| ≤
√
ζe becomes
irrelevant. This way, the cognitive radio may lose some transmission
opportunities, but the lifetime of the cognitive radio increases, and
data transmission security is also assured. Further, in case we are
dealing with a real-time system, the quality of the cognitive chan-
nel can be improved with respect to the eavesdropper channel by
adding artificial noise to the eavesdropper through the cooperation
of friendly jammers [13, 14, 15].
Considering the fact that if a > b,
(
1+aPc
1+bPc
)
is a monotonic in-
creasing function in Pc, the optimal solution of (12) becomes the
maximum Pc in the feasible set of the problem which is P ∗c =
min
{
Pc,max,
Emax−PsTs[
pi0(1−Pf )+pi1(1−Pd)
]
(T−Ts)
}
when |hc| >
√
ζe.
So far, we have considered solving (9) for a given λ and Ts.
Now, we solve the problem for a given Pc. This way, (9) becomes
as follows
max
λ,Ts
pi0(1− Pf )T − Ts
T
s.t. Pd ≥ α,
PsTs +
[
pi0(1− Pf ) + pi1(1− Pd)
]
Pc(T − Ts) ≤ Emax,
0 < Ts < T. (13)
For a given Ts, the optimal solution to (13) is obtained by the mini-
mum Pf in the feasible set of the problem. Since Pd is a monotonic
increasing function of Pf [16], the minimum Pd in the feasible set
of the problem, is the optimal solution. Note that Pd is a one-to-one
function of λ, and thus finding the optimal Pd is equivalent to find-
ing λ. The minimumPd is obtained byP ∗d = max
{
α, Pd(Emax)
}
,
where Pd(Emax) is the minimum Pd for which the second constraint
in (13) is satisfied with equality.
Inserting P ∗d in (13) and P ∗c when |hc| >
√
ζe, (9) can be solved
by the following algorithm,
|hc| ≤
√
ζe : R∗s = 0,
|hc| >
√
ζe : R∗s = argmax
Ts
pi0
(
1− Pf (P ∗d )
)
Cs,H0(P ∗c (P ∗d ))
s.t. 0 < Ts ≤ T, (14)
where R∗s denotes the maximum secrecy throughput. Note that, in
this paper, a Rayleigh fading model is considered for the eavesdrop-
per channel. However, the algorithm in (14) is independent from the
type of the channel and can be applied to any model as far as the
average eavesdropper channel gain is known.
3. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy throughput of the cog-
nitive radio in different scenarios. A Chipcon 2420 transceiver
based on IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee is employed to model the cog-
nitive radio. Based on this model, the sensing power is approx-
imately Ps ≃ 40 mW and the maximum transmission power is
Pc,max ≃ 20 mW [3]. For both the cognitive and eavesdropper
channel, a Rayleigh fading channel model is considered. Further,
we assume T = 100 ms, σ2w = 1, and the received SNR from the
primary user γ = 0 dB.
Fig. 2 depicts the average maximum secrecy throughput ver-
sus average cognitive channel gain denoted by ζc, for different val-
ues of pi0. In this figure, we assume Emax = 6000 µJ, ζe = 1,
pi0 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.8, and we let ζc to change from 1 to 10. It is shown
that by increasing the ratio ζc/ζe, the secrecy throughput improves.
This verifies that improving the quality of the cognitive channel with
respect to the eavesdropper channel can potentially enhance the se-
crecy throughput of the cognitive radio. Further, the secrecy outage
probability defined by Pr(|hc| ≤ ζe) can be reduced with increas-
ing ζc/ζe. We can also see that as the probability of primary user
absence increases, the secrecy throughput of the cognitive radio also
increases. This is due to the higher chance of transmission when the
primary user is absent.
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Fig. 2. Average maximum secrecy throughput versus average cog-
nitive channel gain for different values of pi0, and for ζe = 1,
Ps = 40 mW, Pc,max = 20 mW, γ = 0 dB, and Emax = 6000 µJ.
The average maximum secrecy throughput versus ζc is shown
in Fig. 3 for different values of Emax. In this figure, we assume
ζe = 1, pi0 = 0.5, Emax = 60, 600, 6000 µJ, and again we let ζc
to change from 1 to 10. As is depicted, the most important result
of this figure is that as the energy constraint of the cognitive radio
becomes stricter, we may reach a point where even by improving the
ratio ζc/ζe, the secrecy throughput of the cognitive radio can not be
improved significantly. In such a situation, small channel estimation
errors may lead to a non-secure cognitive transmission. The only
feasible solution in such scenarios is to increase the available energy
of the system, for example by incorporating some energy harvesting
techniques.
To evaluate the tightness of the bound in (11), in Fig. 4, the
sub-optimal secrecy capacity obtained by the Jensen’s inequality is
compared with the optimal one obtained by exhaustive search, with
respect to the cognitive channel gain. Without loss of generality, we
assumeEmax →∞, and thus the power constraint in (12) reduces to
Pc ≤ Pc,max. Further, ζe = 1, and we let ζc to change from 1 to 10.
Note that here we are only interested in the tightness of the bound,
and thus we only consider the secrecy capacity and not the effect of
λ and Ts. As we can see the sub-optimal solution is very close to
the optimal one. This shows that the bound used in this paper is very
tight at least for low values of the power.
4. CONCLUSION
We considered power allocation in a cognitive radio system in the
presence of an eavesdropper. The underlying problem was defined
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Fig. 3. Average maximum secrecy throughput versus average cog-
nitive channel gain for different values of Emax, and for ζe = 1,
Ps = 40 mW, Pc,max = 20 mW, γ = 0 dB, and pi0=0.5.
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Fig. 4. Average maximum secrecy capacity versus average cognitive
channel gain for ζe = 1, Emax →∞, and Pc,max = 20 mW.
so as to maximize the secrecy throughput in order to determine the
sensing threshold, and to allocate resources including the sensing
time and the transmission power. To solve the problem efficiently,
a lower-bound on the secrecy capacity was optimized and conse-
quently, it was shown that the sub-optimal strategy is to neither
sense, nor transmit when the cognitive channel gain is less than the
average eavesdropper channel gain. The secrecy throughput of the
cognitive radio was evaluated by employing the IEEE 802.15.4/Zig-
Bee standard. It was shown that although improving the quality of
the cognitive channel with respect to the eavesdropper channel can
potentially improve the secrecy throughput, but as the maximum
available energy per time-frame reduces, we may reach a point that
the secrecy throughput of the system can not be improved, even with
improving the cognitive channel gain. Further, it was shown that the
solution obtained by the lower-bound on the secrecy capacity is very
close to the optimal one obtained from exhaustive search.
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